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Abstract: The purpose of this note is to contrast a Cantorian outlook with a non-Cantorian one 
and to present a picture that provides support for the latter. In particular, I suggest that: i) infinite 
hyperreal numbers are the (actual, determined) infinite numbers, ii) ω is merely potentially 
infinite, and iii) infinitesimals should not be used in the di Finetti lottery. Though most 
Cantorians will likely maintain a Cantorian outlook, the picture is meant to motivate the obvious 
nature of the non-Cantorian outlook. 
 
How many finite natural numbers, (1, 2, 3…), are there? On the Cantorian view, if we consider 
order, then we arrive at Cantor’s smallest infinite ordinal, ω. Moving away from order, any set 
that can be mapped bijectively with the natural numbers is countable, Cantor’s smallest infinite 
cardinal number. In general, Cantor’s infinite ordinals and cardinals are the infinite numbers. 
Cantor argued that ω is actual and determined, and not merely a potential infinity. If we consider 
the natural numbers to be an actual and determined set, it is natural to think about random 
equiprobable selections from the natural numbers. Such a random selection is sometimes called 
the “di Finetti Lottery.” What is the probability of selecting one specific natural number, e.g. 7, 
from all of them? 0 seems to be too small a probability1 and any real number is too large a 
probability. A positive infinitesimal number is larger than 0 and smaller than any real number—
which seems to be exactly what we are looking for. Indeed, people continue to suggest using 
infinitesimals for such a lottery.2 In the chart below, let me summarize the Cantorian outlook 
outlined above and contrast the non-Cantorian outlook. 
 Cantorian Outlook Non-Cantorian Outlook 
Cantor’s ordinals and cardinals are the infinite 
numbers. 
Infinite hyperreal numbers are the infinite 
numbers. 
The Cantorian infinite, for example ω, is 
actual and determined. These infinities are not 
merely potential. 
ω, and also a ray, are merely potential. They 
are not actual and determined. 
Infinitesimals should be used as the correct 
probability in the di Finetti Lottery. 
Infinitesimals should not3 be used as the 
correct probability in the di Finetti Lottery. 
 
In what follows, pictures are used to motivate the non-Cantorian outlook. Consider two parallel 
real rays. Begin at 0, place them 1 unit apart, and draw a perpendicular line at 1 unit:  
 
We can then pick any real number on the top ray, draw a line to 0 on the bottom ray, and 
consider where this line crosses our unit line. In the diagram below, we see that when we select 3 
on the top line, the line to the origin of the bottom line crosses our unit line at 1/3. In general, a 
consideration of similar triangles (consider opposite over adjacent for angle a – the ratio is 1/3 
for the larger and the smaller triangles) means that selecting x on the top ray results in a line to 
the origin that crosses the unit line at 1/x. We have a geometric interpretation of the reciprocal.  
 
  
Let us carry these considerations into the hyperreal realm, by considering two hyperreal rays. 
These rays again begin at 0, but now contain infinitesimal and infinite numbers. The rays are 
non-Archimedean, meaning that any infinite number cannot be “reached” by adding a finite 
number a finite number of times. A positive infinitesimal is greater than 0 and less than any real 
number. The inverse of an infinitesimal is an infinite number (not necessarily a whole number). 
After the initial hyperreal ray extending from the origin, we have copies of hyperreals that are 
densely-linearly-ordered without endpoints. 
We can again pick any number on the top ray. If we select an infinite number, M, the line 
to the origin crosses our unit line at 1/M. 
 
 
 
If we make the straightforward assumption that the correct probability of selecting one number 
from a whole number n, in an equiprobable selection, is 1/n, then we run into a problem when we 
consider the di Finetti Lottery (an equiprobable, random selection from the natural numbers). 
Imagine the person who comes along and says: “I see how the picture and procedure above let 
me arrive at the probability of an equiprobable selection from 3 numbers or from M numbers. 
But how do I arrive at the probability of selecting a number from the natural numbers (the di 
Finetti Lottery)?” The picture is meant to motivate the view that there is no good answer to give 
the person. As the person noted, we can arrive at the correct probability of a selection from a 
finite number of outcomes. And we can arrive at the correct probability of selection from an 
infinite hyperreal number of outcomes. But there is no place to sink our teeth in, as it were, in 
order to arrive at the probability for the di Finetti Lottery.4 What we want, in some sense, is to 
corral all of the (finite) natural numbers in the top line, find the spot where this is, and then draw 
the line to the origin of the bottom line. But there is no there, there; we simply have nowhere 
from which to begin drawing our line. There is an obvious sense in which any finite number is 
too far to the left; any infinite hyperreal number is too far to the right.5 Such considerations 
suggest that the set of finite natural numbers is an example of the potentially infinite, whereas 
any specific infinite hyperreal number is an example of the actually infinite.6 
 
We do not have to begin at the top line, nor do we have to work in a discrete setting (to this point 
we have focused on integers, whole numbers). Let us shift the story. Imagine that we allow a 
person to select a number on the unit line. We then draw a line from 0 on the bottom line, 
through the unit line’s selection, to the top line. (So for example, if the person chooses 1/3 on the 
unit line, the line from the origin of the bottom line, through 1/3 on the unit line, meets the top 
line at 3.) Perhaps the person receives a prize of a length of golden rope from 0 to the spot on the 
top line where the diagonal line crosses. For example, a person who selects 1/π on the unit line 
receives rope from 0 to π, that is, [0, π]. A person who selects the infinitesimal ε on the unit line 
(so X = 1/ε is an infinite hyperreal) receives rope from 0 to X.  
 Now imagine that a person comes along and says “What I really want is the initial ray, that is, 
the length of rope that is all and only those parts of rope that are a finite distance from 0. How do 
I get that? What spot on the unit line do I select to arrive at that piece of rope?” Well, we seem to 
be in a bit of a conundrum. Any positive real number selected on the unit line (e.g., 1/3, 1/π, or 
1/1010) will result in a finite length of rope. Any infinitesimal number, ε, will result in an infinite 
length of rope of length X = 1/ε, i.e., [0, X], where X is infinite. There is no point on the unit line 
that we can select to arrive at the ray that the person desires. But the obvious reason seems to be 
because the person is neither asking for a finite length of rope nor for an infinite length of rope. 
Rather, the person is asking for a length of rope that is merely potential (not actual and 
determined). 
 
The picture of the hyperreal lines (separated by a unit line) and the procedures described above 
are meant to motivate the position that each particular finite number is determined and actual, as 
is each particular infinite, hyperreal number. But the set of all finite natural numbers, and the ray, 
are not actual and determined infinities. (Each also awkwardly falls strictly between the finite 
and the actual infinite.) That is why there is no equiprobable selection from the natural numbers 
and why no number can be selected on the unit line to arrive at the ray. The picture and 
procedures also suggest that numbers should be taken to be numbers that occur on the hyperreal 
line and that infinitesimals are not the correct probability of selection for the di Finetti Lottery.7  
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Notes 
1 If we must assign a probability using the reals, then it must be 0. Of course, a countable sum of 
0’s is 0 (and not 1, as we would like). 
2 For example see Gwiazda (2008) and Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers (2018). Note that the 
latter builds on the authors’ earlier work. Also note that I do not claim that Cantor himself 
endorsed the view of using infinitesimals for the di Finetti lottery (indeed Cantor did not like 
infinitesimals). Rather the claim is that many modern Cantorians consider the di Finetti lottery 
and suggest using infinitesimals, in part motivated, I suggest, by Cantor’s claim that the natural 
numbers are a completed, actual, determined infinite set. 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Cantorians often argue (beginning from Cantorian assumptions) that infinitesimals can 
consistently be used in the di Finetti lottery. The consistency issue is more complicated than 
some believe, I suggest, though it must be admitted that no outright contradiction has been 
generated to date. Here I note that claims of consistency are different from the claim that 
infinitesimals should be used. 
4 Gwiazda (2012) and Pruss (2014) have argued, in the manner followed here, that infinitesimals 
are not the probability of selection from the di Finetti lottery. However, see Benci, Horsten, and 
Wenmackers (2018) for an opposing view. 
5 Put another way, any finite number is too small to count the natural numbers; any infinite 
number is too large to count the natural numbers. 
6 Note that Gwiazda (2013) presented a test to determine whether an infinity is potential or 
actual, namely: do random selections seem to get larger through sequential selections? If yes, the 
infinity is merely potential. 
7 Note that of course Cantorian developments were needed for the development of the hyperreals; 
that point does not rescue the Cantorian outlook. Put another way: from the point of the view of 
the non-Cantorian outlook, basing a system of infinite numbers on the collection of natural 
numbers is a historical accident. The collection of natural numbers was the first and easiest 
example of a collection that is clearly not finite. Only the utmost laziness could allow one to 
conclude from this that it follows that the collection of natural numbers is an example of an 
infinite (whole, natural) number. The Cantorians have chosen this path, choosing to ignore the 
basic question: what is the correct extension of the concept of finite, whole number into the 
infinite? 
